

## Order and its Shadow: Delinquency as Reproduction and Resistance

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### Introduction

As societies attempt to create order and structure they produce symptoms of distress, such as high rates of crime, delinquency and mental disorder. The project of developing a totalizing perspective on a phenomenon as varied and complex as delinquency requires a search into both the underlying structuring principles that create the social order and local subsystems shaped by the uneven pressures of society as a whole.

Delinquency is not a monolithic phenomenon, but rather a series of overlapping syndromes. Consequently many different types of theory emerge, each of which is plausible as an explanation for certain types, aspects or characteristics of delinquency. A beginning can be made by granting the discontinuity and overlap of the disparate syndromes. Given that there are different but overlapping causes, there is no single life situation, system or subsystem that inevitably shapes an adolescent into a delinquent. Yet there are alternative pathways generally associated with historical conditions of discontinuity and destabilization. It is possible to discover the routes by which many adolescents are shaped and constrained by our ordinary daily practices. Even then, it is useful to be cautious about a singularizing view of the constituting factors. Ultimately, delinquency is a phenomenon that can stand for many things, so our task remains to uncover the particulars of each case.

This essay examines the persistence of delinquency in complex societies. It links a variety of theories from different fields and consequently contains a partial review of the literature. It principally seeks insights within the variation and multiplicity of the phenomena for the socio-cultural regularities which shape contrastive patterns of populations or subgroups in rates of delinquency, at this very general level a comparative model can be constructed to explain group differences in rates of delinquency. Certain types of delinquency are part of a discourse of resistance as well as being routinely produced by unequal advances in economic development and the gap-widening effect of systems. In this sense, at the population level there is something other than 'freedom in history operating.

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### **Core and Periphery Dynamic: Gap-Widening Effects of Systems**

Wallerstein (1979), Frank (1974), Adams (1974) and others have observed that throughout the world one finds marked contrast between the advancing core and eroding peripheries of societal development. Wallerstein and others argue that the problems of people at the margins of systems are created by the design features of the world-system economy. In the world economic system there is a characteristic search for new markets, cheap labor, new technology and cheaper forms of production. New low-paid workers are brought in to compete with old workers. Low-income sector populations are moved, relocated, rechanneled or laid off during periods of economic crisis. Frequently they come from technologically backward areas, have minimal skills, and are easily replaced. More generally they are located in crowded, criminogenic conditions of urban and industrial areas. In addition, labor markets and centers may rapidly shift to suit the demands for increased profit for reinvestment. A cheap labor reserve that is in a strategically poor bargaining position tends to build. Many individual economizing decisions of middle- and upper-income sectors collectively create and reinforce patterns of dependency for low-income populations. Consequently, destabilization, dependency and the potential for dissatisfaction are built into the position of low-income populations in the basic structural dynamics of the world-system political economy. Adams (1974) views the gap-widening effects of marginalization in terms of the social entropy resultant from technological processes, in which increments of order at the center of a social system have historically entailed increments of disorder at the periphery.

The gap is widest between peripheral and semiperipheral geopolitical areas in the Third World, as compared to advanced technological centers. In the Third World, strategies for the control of marginality are minimal, even in contrast to the welfare policies of advanced capitalist economies and full employment policies of socialist economies.

Elevated rates of crime and delinquency are part of a more complex global pattern of relative destabilization, deprivation and marginality of low-income sectors. At the extreme, in politically destabilized regions, the constellation of gap-widening effects is a major factor affecting the level of violence at the periphery in the world-system. U.N. data, for example, in a comparison of six contrastive geopolitical regions, show that the level of violence increases in sociopolitical areas that have a low GNP, pronounced underdevelopment of middle-income sectors and the greatest gaps between rich and poor—namely in the more peripheralized areas of the world-system. Violence declines comparatively in more advanced industrial nations (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984).

Poverty is only one of a series of interrelated factors. As Foucault (1967) has noted, part of the strategy for dealing with the poor has historically involved their containment, along with the criminogenic and mentally disordered, in isolation from middle- and upper-income populations. Destabilization of low-income populations and communities also leads to competition among low-income groups for jobs and territory. Within this process many previously stable low-income communities are invaded and undergo periods of destabilization. Traditional family structure and hierarchies break down or be-

come too rigid as a defense against destabilization. This complex process of uprooting and destabilizing populations increases the potential for racial and ethnic violence, especially during periods of assimilation as the boundaries between groups begin to break down or become threatened. These are the conditions of low-income populations that across societies and across time have been associated with elevated rates of crime and delinquency. These conditions of destabilization reconstitute themselves in each new generation. They are produced by the orbiting of low-income populations around the needs, decisions and opportunities created or denied by middle- and upper-income sectors, and by the inability of most complex societies to satisfactorily resolve problems of manpower and new population assimilation in technologically advancing modern or modernizing societies.

In advanced capitalist societies, class struggle is often displaced into the terminology and rhetoric of ethno-nationalism (Wallerstein, 1979). In peripheral areas of the world-system, ethnic conflict often tends to be more violent than in core areas. However, even in core areas many ethnic groups remain relegated to ghettos, to be divided into members who are recruited into high status or middle status jobs and those of lower status "who are recruited into subproletarian positions (unskilled labor and lumpenproletarian, marginal, or criminal employments)" (Wallerstein, 1979, p. 187): Those in the latter strata frequently develop radical or revolutionary consciousness, largely because reform within the system is unlikely. Thus the periphery of the world-system political economy is generally more radical and resistant in orientation than other sectors. Middle-income sectors serve to mediate the nature of the conflict. The organized level of violence is generally lower where polarization between sectors is less great. But elevated rates of crime, delinquency and mental disorder persist in the low-income, low-status sectors.

### **Social Divisions of Experience: Systems of Differential Risk of Delinquency**

There is considerable evidence that the effects of the world-system economy override differences in culture and ideology at the societal level. In all complex societies in the world system, delinquency is part of an intricate dynamic of complex hierarchical systems. The underlying, deep cultural principles which define the social order (class, gender, ethnic category, age) shape social relations, creating patterns of contrast, so that multiple socio-demographic variables are at work systematically affecting rates of crime and delinquency across the world-system as well as within societies at the same level of socio-economic development. One can usefully review the divisions of social experience which influence differential risk of delinquency in terms of these factors.

### **The Class Bias**

A comparative study of delinquency patterns across industrialized societies notes two major cross-cutting factors: the "class deprivation factor" and the "adolescent deprivation factor" (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983). Across each society in the sample, the risk for delinquency is greatest in the lower socioeconomic class as compared to upper and middle classes. The profound class

contrast characterizes delinquency patterns in societies as culturally and ideologically diverse as Japan, Sweden, Russia, Argentina, Israel, France and the U.S. There is also an invariant universal "peak age" effect: between the ages of 15 and 17 the rates rise sharply and then fall as dramatically for adolescents in the sample, regardless of social classes and differences in life condition, culture or ideological background. The shape of the curve across populations has been invariant for 150 years (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983).

It is not simply objective class placement, but the subjective experience of class position that is involved in differential rates of delinquency. People have subjective maps of class structure and socio-economic class distance and self placement within it. For example, a male in the lower socio-economic class may identify himself with middle-class values, interests and gender codes. The class question is significant in multiple respects. It organizes loyalties and ties to others. It shapes perception of opportunity and mobility potential. It influences patterns of alliance and perceptions of the relationship of one's own group to other groups, even at a political level. Embedded within concepts of class and class distances are notions of alliance and opposition of ethnic groups.

Classic sociological explanations of contrastive group rates at the socio-cultural level emphasize patterns of differential constraint, opportunity and channeling of populations. Merton (1957) emphasizes the importance of success and mobility. He links elevated rates of delinquency to blockage of access to legitimate means to achieve these objectives. Cloward and Ohlin (1960), following Shaw and McKay (1942), emphasize differential location in the opportunity structure and the channeling of low-income populations into environments with different opportunities to learn and participate in criminal or deviant behaviors. Colvin and Pauly (1983) speak of "delinquency production systems" which create differential routing by social class. They place considerable emphasis on the centrality of schools in this process of channelization. They, along with many other researchers, emphasize the prevalence of negative attitudes to both school and menial or meaningless work in low-income populations.

Most theories of delinquency emphasize the constraints and pressures on low-income populations. Consignment to different types of locations and behavioral settings becomes but one aspect of the shaping of populations. Merton's theory emphasizes the gap between expectations and constraints on mobility, especially for minority populations, as causal factors in delinquency production. Other researchers argue that there are alternative responses to the predicament. The work of Shaw and McKay (1942) has been important in emphasizing that lower sector communities may split or polarize as they adopt alternative perspectives and orientations under equivalent situations of constraint. The work of these authors and other studies suggest that there is not a shared normative structure, but rather there are contradictory perspectives towards or against law-abiding behavior under situations of considerable blockage and constraint.

Sutherland and Cressey's (1955) now classic theory of "differential association" in delinquency emphasizes ties to groups with deviant behaviors. In modern terms this could be rephrased as "varying network membership," so that as individuals are given similar opportunities to engage in deviance within the

same community, the intensity of such contrastive ties could make the critical difference. The theory that people most isolated from mainstream society, experiencing themselves as powerless and dissatisfied with their position, are most likely to be willing to use violence has received considerable empirical support (see Clark, 1968 for a partial review). The degree of distance in both a social and spatial sense from mainstream society, as well as blockage of access to legitimate opportunity, intensity of ties to deviant groups, and opportunity to engage in deviancy become factors in a complex equation.

At a level above that of localized groups and networks, socio-cultural systems in complex societies create an intricate dialectic of systems of alliance and opposition by sector and within the low-income sector, which in turn generates differential pathways channeling the flow of opportunity or blockage, and establishing different barriers for ethnic groups and social classes or strata. It is this complex and often invisible structure of social ties that influences emergent differences in delinquency rates. Although individuals may cross the boundaries, the system of differential constraint and opportunity itself remains relatively unmodified over time, producing and reproducing parallel effects on new populations in the same structural locations and on older populations caught in the same environment and behavioral settings across generations.

The socio-economic and class factors which influence rates of delinquency in a variety of ways also influence the replication of competitive disadvantage in terms of levels of competence and skill. Brofenbrenner (1974) and Garbarino (1982) emphasize differential risks and differential ties in their research on child development and disadvantage. They also locate the problem of differential disadvantage in low-income sector populations in the policies and decisions of upper-income sectors that generate the opportunity system and which indirectly influence parental competence, experiences of power or powerlessness and eventual competence and skill development in children. Too little involvement of outside agencies makes it difficult for low-income sector populations to alter their competence, position or environment.

### **The Gender Bias**

Various researchers have emphasized a pronounced gender bias in crime and delinquency rates. Aggregate statistical patterns suggest that the risk for major crime and delinquency is greater for males, especially in lower class sectors across complex societies (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983). Within the complex class dialectic, gender differences are important, given contrasts in role and code. For example, the ability to seriously injure - or, conversely, the obligation to protect and defend territory, to display prowess, competence or courage under the threat of challenge-is generally an aspect of the male role. Yet gender roles are also influenced by class even with respect to deviant behaviors, so that "blue collar" crime takes a different form than "white collar" crime, which is superficially more respectable.

Explanations for the lower socio-economic status and gender bias in crime also require a search into occupational roles. Impairment of men's capacity to perform as occupational head of the family, for example, has serious implications for status and self-esteem and can lead to a diminution of his place in both

the family hierarchy and the male peer group hierarchy. In situations of constraint and blockage of opportunity in this arena, the male may experience considerable frustration and loss of self-esteem, feeling among other things that he is not quite a man among men. As gender identity is implicated, a pattern of high self-testing may be set in motion. Researchers (see Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983) have noted patterns of male protest, or hypermasculine behavior, in lower-income males across various cultures, often to the extent that it is part of the code of expected behavior as a factor in delinquency rates. Male gender insecurity can increase a willingness to take greater risks or to respond more readily to a perceived threat by meeting aggression with aggression.

### **Political Aspects**

The political dimensions of social inequality must also be centrally considered in a general theory of delinquency. Historically, males in the subaltern populations (lower working class, and under class or marginally employed) have had the highest rates of crime and delinquency. These are the very strata that classic theorists of "class struggle" have seen as the historical agents of change. Under specific historical conditions, the male population most afflicted with elevated crime and delinquency rates has been the same stratum involved in radical political change through revolution in politically destabilized societies. The direction that these strata take depends on the configuration of more complex social forces and the nature of the groups that throughout history have allied with or against them. In the 1960s, for example, significant changes in the world-system occurred with the remission of colonialism. Third World advancement mobilized many minorities. Segments of these ethnic groups and strata became increasingly militant or at least activist during that period, encouraged by the growth of new collective identities and "conditions of possibility" (Jameson, 1985, p. 181). The decade temporarily fed the new forces for radical changes and reform, again raising expectations and leading to collective activity that made some changes in the nature of social boundaries. This is not to suggest that radical strains and traditions within populations with elevated rates of delinquency begin at this time, but only to note that in certain historical periods the struggles for equity may take more overt and organized form, engaging a larger proportion of the population.

In general, populations with elevated rates of crime and delinquency are also those which experience and express profound discontent with their position. At the extreme such populations develop separatist, radical and militant groups with attendant splits and cleavages. Delinquency becomes one symptom among others of resistance to the established system and order. However, populations with elevated rates of crime and delinquency do not inevitably evolve a single unified and shared strategy for altering their position in their respective societies. A proportion seeks to move into other niches and social classes. Others respond by accepting the status quo or by partial acceptance and partial resistance.

A shared external reality, despite its constraints and repressive barriers, does not inevitably lead to a shared view of the possibilities of a life world. There is no single "politics of poverty." But the availability or absence of integrative

cultural programs, plans and perceptions for possibilities of change of the world or of one's position in it plays a major role in orientations towards delinquency. The traditional emphasis of many peoples on family and religion serves as a barrier against the eroding forces of marginalized environments. Either traditional or radical subcultures that emphasize transformation can partially influence levels of risk in delinquency.

### **Treatment and Aspects of Community Integration**

Many researchers take the position that policy and treatment of the problems of the urban poor are the critical factors in delinquency. Perlman (1976, p. 243), for example, in a study of the *favelas* or shanty towns of Brazil argues that the *favelados* generally have the aspirations of the middle-income sectors and are extremely hard working, but lack the opportunity to fulfill their aspirations. Bonilla (1970), studying the same population, emphasized the social disorganization of some of these communities but also saw the problem as lying at the level of failure in social and economic policy. Perlman (1976) and others take the position that the bottom stratum of marginals "is just one of many competing and conflicting groups - specifically a powerless group subject to a good deal of coercion and doing very little coercing" politically, as compared to groups in other sectors. The more fundamental issue is the power differential between sectors and the historical inability of low-income sectors to develop effective coalitions to either change the system or, more generally, to become centrally involved in the decision-making processes affecting their life conditions.

Following the work of classic theorists such as Merton, considerable emphasis is now placed on the aspect of transactions and of acceptance or rejection by dominant groups. Experiences of profound rejection further the process of disorganization and alienation. A strong repudiation by one's own group and by dominant and more powerful groups appears to be an important structural condition for out-group or deviant membership (Perlman, 1976). Conversely, delinquency may be partially checked by strong community organization and mobilization.

Delinquency is most likely to flourish in communities which lack strong ties to mainstream society, material and organizational resources, and preexisting bonds of solidarity and leadership to make collective action possible or to sustain individual and collective values against negative external forces and pressures. Variation of rates of crime or delinquency also depend on the nature and presence of groups recruiting in the local environment.

### **Deviance, Social Values, and Personality**

The relation between social values and personality on the one hand, and deviance on the other is powerfully mediated by the nature of local community organization or disorganization, and of transactions across groups and populations, which together constitute the very structure of societal integration. As has been noted by many, industrial production tears labor from its symbolic and the "collective"

lifestyle is dissipated into privatized concerns and alienated social processes. As populations are uprooted, experience and life worlds are fragmented. The poor can become increasingly isolated. Cross-community relations can take on a conflict perspective, and the communities of the poor become increasingly polarized with too little support and contact with upper-income groups.

A generally alienated system of societal values can take a more extreme form for those at the bottom of the system. In a discussion of the Black ghetto, Rainwater, et al. (1970) describe the fragmentation of community life in a situation in which social ties are relatively weak, neighbor is set against neighbor in the daily struggle for existence, and the major bulwarks against community decay are largely traditional, religious, voluntary organizations that have relatively low attraction for the young. When a general conflict perspective develops across communities, the communities of the poor tend to mobilize against agents of authority and those seen as oppressors from outside, but again with disapprobation by more law-abiding and traditional members of the community. Rainwater, et al. (1979) take the position that, under conditions of experienced extreme scarcity and isolation from mainstream society, some of the ghettoized population come to see survival as depending on "going for yourself" rather than on assuming responsibility for others. Such alienation sharply contrasts with the almost excessive investment in others more typical of traditional populations, which can also lead to individuals and families being stuck at the bottom.

Thus, within what may appear to be a shared predicament of extreme constraint and pressures, families and individuals develop alternative strategies. Some families become too tightly joined, and others too disorganized. Extreme polarization tends to develop in the absence of mediating middle-class ties and connections with mainstream society, and as more populations feel powerless to make it within the normal system.

In general, alienation, feelings of powerlessness at the community level and elevated rates of delinquency are most pronounced in groups and subpopulations that have been historically the most disadvantaged, destabilized and devalued in societies (Jessor et al., 1968, pp. 302-309).

### **Situating Delinquency Within the Totality**

The attempt to psychologize so-called "deviant" behavior of adolescents can suffer many vicissitudes. There is strong evidence of powerful system effects operating differentially on specific populations. Given that there have been notable differences in the historical experiences and treatment of subpopulations and that there are multiple syndromes as well, no single psychological theory of delinquency is likely to emerge.

Different types of theory are needed to explain various aspects of delinquency at the specific syndrome level. Class position does not play the same role across all syndromes of delinquency. Delinquency is not a single syndrome. Certain types of syndromes (e.g., rape as opposed to petty theft) may involve deeper pathology. Some, more than others, reflect a breakdown in subsystems such as the family, while others reflect the multiple pressures and cumulative effects of a wide variety of local environmental pressures and factors, including

multiple constraints *on* mobility and status but also the variable nature *of* structures and supports. But, as Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) note, most adolescents in all sectors show spontaneous remission in delinquent behaviors following the "peak age" period, although the same constellation *of* factors continues to generate the same effects over time.

Situating delinquency as a subject within the totality *of* interpenetrating systems poses a series *of* methodological problems. First, the hidden logic *of* delinquency cannot be accounted *for* by the analysis *of* a single culture *or* subculture. In the modern world, culture and subculture are shaped by the manner *of* embedding in larger units such as class, community, region, and national and world-system. Second, studies show the importance *of* a range *of* factors, including class, gender, location *or* ethnic group. Broken homes and low self-esteem make some difference but have less predictive power at a statistical level. Third, *from* an institutional perspective, subsystems (home, school media, local neighborhood) interact so that it become difficult to separate *out* the effects *of* a single subsystem.

### **Anonymous Rules: Constraints in Subsystems**

Anthropologists have argued that deviance-proneness is a feature *of* social structure (Jessor et al., 1978). Ethnic groups are not homogenous units with respect to rates *of* delinquency *or* deviance. On the contrary, rates *of* delinquency within cultural groups show striking differences rather than uniformities. Typically, despite differences in culture *of* minority and majority groups, the bottom stratum *of* disparaged minorities tends to have elevated rates *of* delinquent behaviors. Third, comparisons *of* rates *of* delinquency across ethnic groups show the effects *of* differences in the relative power and status *of* ethnic groups ranked against each *other* in the general direction predicted by classic opportunity and constraint theories.

Disparaged status and economic marginality produce the most extreme effects: namely, a relatively predictable although varied constellation *of* social, psychological and subcultural features in afflicted segments *of* a minority groups. In a study *of* a triethnic community (Anglo, Spanish, Indian) in the American Southwest, *for* example, Graves and Graves (1978) note a range of traits that are associated with relative disparaged status and decreased access to economic opportunities, and which include lowered expectations, greater apathy, retreatism, alienation and increased hostility. A remission *of* symptomatic behaviors in segments of the Spanish and Native American populations *occurs* under conditions *of* increased economic opportunity and advancement, that is, as the conditions *of* discriminatory status and constraint diminish. Devos's (1978) study *of* disparaged minorities in Japan shows striking parallels with the findings *of* the tri-ethnic study and *other* comparative research *of* the same type.

Many traits of disparaged minorities are hybrid, being shaped by the nature *of* the contact between two cultures. Acculturation situations lead to an interpenetration of traditional cultural value systems. In the process of acculturation there is a "potential *for* a dislocation *of* means and end relations" (Graves & Graves, 1978), so that the traditional ways of gaining status no longer inevitably

work. Simultaneously, acculturating populations acquire norms, beliefs and values from other groups. Around the world, the acculturation process is mediated by different types of "cultural brokers" for different social classes and strata. In considering the emergent and variable traits of ethnic groups in modern societies, "regardless of which came first, culture, situation or personality, the important thing is that all three be considered" (Graves & Graves, 1978, p. 535).

One of the most extreme cases in the U.S. of a population shaped towards deviance by complex historical forces, is that of the subaltern Black population. This population is chosen to exemplify the constellation of features produced by discriminatory status and economic marginality because it is one of the best studied in the literature. At the same time, anything other than an overview is beyond the scope of this paper, for that reason.

Poor urban Black males are in a deviance-prone structural position compared to middle- and upper-income Blacks and as against many other ethnic groups, given a centuries long history of legal segregation and continued economic and social marginality. As delinquency is a dependent variable, a lack of change in the economic situation of this population would lead us to predict a lack of change in deviance-proneness.

How different are the risks for the Black underclass male? The question is strikingly addressed by Cordes (1985). Cordes notes that the Black underclass male suffers a syndrome of afflictions which include: a higher probability of death in infancy, one out of three Black children - with the probability\_\_ being male more often than female - pushed out of or dropping out of school consignment to back-breaking labor with increased potential for physical disability, increased recourse to drugs and alcohol, and a peak suicide rate during the ages of 25-40-the period when others are at a peak of career success. They have a high probability of ending up in a mental hospital, of killing or being killed by other subaltern Black males. They make up 350/0 of the population in local jails and 45% of the population in state and federal prisons (1978 figures). Cordes, in addition, notes that the annual income of many is less than \$3,000 a year, an income strikingly below the poverty line.

Structural theories deal with the interconnection and feedback between people and their context. Many sociological and observable psychological features associated with deviance-prone populations develop as a response to environmental conditions. Many structural features associated with the so-called subculture of the Black urban poor develop as a result of the niches to which the Blacks are confined when coming into urban industrial societies.

Historically, certain ubiquitous social types develop under crowded slum conditions. Researchers have noted that logically there are three minimal contrast points in reactions that populations have to crowded, criminogenic environments. The individual can accept his position as a victim of the ghetto, or rebel and protest against it. He or she can join organized groups - voluntary or religious - or take an individual path. The reaction of rage may be overtly aggressive and violent, or may turn against the self (Allport, 1954).

Severe constraints operating on a population tend to generate a continuum of syndromes: on the one hand, there are the severe to moderately psychologically distressed or disabled, and on the other hand, relatively normal individuals with

considerable desire to achieve but whose achievement motivations are severely blocked. In an empirical study of a housing project in the Black ghetto, McCord et al. (1969) note the range of social identities and adaptative reactions, which include the psychotic, the stoic, the defeated, the achiever, the exploiter, the rebel and the revolutionary.

Researchers studying populations with elevated rates of delinquency observe traits of apathy, *anomie* and normlessness. Many assume too readily that elevated rates of delinquency are inevitably produced by low achievement motivation. But a lack of achievement motivation or low self-esteem does not invariably predict elevated rates of delinquency. On the contrary, in a study of motivation in Indians in low economic access positions in the Southwest, Graves and Graves (1978) note that frustrated high achievers under conditions of constraint have elevated rates of deviant behaviors. As Merton noted, the more central problem is often that of the "ineligible aspirant." The person in this circumstance "goes through the process of anticipatory socialization in adopting the values and norms of the group that he wishes to enter," and is then the victim of "aspirations that he cannot hope to achieve" (Perlman, 1976, p. 101).

The history of the Black urban poor illustrates the dual effect of discrimination and marginality. Underlying the striking fact of extreme discrimination against Blacks, there is the more general worldwide problem, namely, one in which under skilled agrarian populations relocate in urban areas in massive numbers under conditions of labor oversupply and accelerated competition for jobs. This kind of economic dilemma is typical of situations across the world where considerable population growth in rural areas coexists with stagnation in a particular sector of the economy, often in labor intensive agriculture. This in turn leads to mass migration to urban areas and rapid growth of low-income enclaves which in some cases become sites for urban crime and delinquency. Behind the special situation of poor urban Black populations stand the more general problems produced by complex transformational processes in the political economy of the world-system.

Blacks began entering Northern industrial cities in large numbers in the 1920s. Before then they were a relatively insignificant minority in the North and did not figure significantly in crime statistics (Harwood, 1969). During that period, the major crime, delinquency and poverty problems involved European immigrant minorities who were for the most part also a landless peasantry in the same general economic predicament as Blacks, that is, displaced because of overpopulation and lack of economic development in their home areas. In many cases, Blacks were able to establish stable communities. But in many other cases, as early sociologists noted, there was considerable breakdown in more stable cultural traditions. New patterns developed. For example, the streetcorner man, marginally and shiftingly employed, has been a ubiquitous figure in many cultural and societal contexts around the world for populations in the reserve labor force, and Blacks gradually added many street-corner men to their number.

As late as 1940, 40% of Black males were employed in agriculture. A pattern of movement of massive numbers to the urban and industrial North and into the central city posed a problem because industry had moved away from the central city and many unemployed or underemployed workers were concentrated in the

cities. In addition to discrimination there were problems of lack of skills suitable to the needs of industrial society. Many in this situation developed a pattern of part-time or sub-employment. The majority were in dead-end jobs or at best concentrated in low-wage industries.

Many socio-demographic factors influenced crime and delinquency levels. For example, Ogburn's (1935) classic comparison of three groups shows the effects of job situation and community size on crime rates. He concludes that lower rates of crime are associated with both larger family size and an increased percentage of the population in manufacture. His study also emphasizes differences in size of community: the percentage of Blacks is positively correlated with crime for large cities, but negatively correlated with crime for middle-size and small cities.

Blacks migrating into the North after the 1920s increasingly entered crowded urban centers and center-city locations that were criminogenic and which had produced elevated rates of crime and delinquency in ethnic group after ethnic group (Shaw & McKay, 1942). These were the classic so-called neighborhoods of "ethnic succession." Many such neighborhoods already had gang organizations. In a study of metropolitan crime rates, Eberts and Schwerin (1968) note elevated rates of crime and delinquency in neighborhoods where the gap between rich and poor is greatest. It is in this context that they develop their classic theory of "relative deprivation."

Over time, however, rates of delinquency showed the greatest increase in areas of new migration, accompanied by continued community destabilization. In Bursik and Webb's (1982) follow-up on the classic Shaw and McKay study, the areas showing the greatest decline in delinquency are areas that had been previously high, but later stabilized (Bursik & Webb, 1982, p. 40).

Many communities continued to be destabilized by the entrance of new groups dislocated by social change. As Privan and Cloward (1971) note, agricultural expansion in the South advanced sections of that region, but displaced Black tenant farmers and other low-income groups who migrated to the already crowded ghettos and inner cities of the North, adding to the problems of communities already under conditions of high levels of unemployment and underemployment.

The struggle to achieve even normal minority status and to improve the conditions impeding normal participation in society had long been a clear objective among Blacks. An early thrust of such movements was the fight against discriminatory codes. Next, there were struggles to desegregate schools. Yet there were many forces that attempted to resist or reverse policies removing these constraints placed on Blacks. So that even after Blacks had mobilized support, several decades were required before legal restrictions were removed.

More general dimensions of the problem of blockage of Blacks from full participation in society obviously relate to a continuous history of racial conflict, and discrimination at the institutional and wider community levels. These constraints again shaped subgroup experience within Black culture. As might be expected, the most disadvantaged, powerless and marginal segments developed greater *anomie* or feelings of hopelessness, greater disbelief in the system and its objectivity, and conditions of possibility, thereby encouraging an increasing tendency to withdrawal (often with greater recourse to alcohol or sub-

stance abuse), aggression or resignation. The more advantaged Blacks, already advanced into the middle classes, sought to struggle through the building of alliances with other groups in order to remove discriminatory codes and provide access for Blacks into many economic areas virtually closed to them.

Under conditions of slavery and extensive racial violence in the South, following the Civil War, Blacks had elevated rates of crime and delinquency. This pattern of elevated violence was not just a Black pattern but rather it was a Southern pattern for both Blacks and Whites. It began with slave rebellions and attempts at resistance; followed by a period, during the Civil War, and Reconstruction, of considerable bitterness on the part of White southerners, characterized by massive attacks on Black communities and individuals. Only after World War I did interracial violence increase in Northern urban areas. Grimshaw (1969, p. 25) distinguished between "Southern style" race riots which were largely one-sided attacks on Black populations, and "Northern style" race riots, such as the Chicago race riot of 1919, in which an attack on a Black youth led to a confrontation involving both Blacks and Whites.

Extreme racial violence in the North generally was associated with major industrial cities such as Philadelphia, Chicago, Houston, New York, and St. Louis. It coexisted with continuance of "Southern style" routine violence, particularly up to the end of legal segregation. Black militancy and protest developed in reaction to the historical pattern of violence directed against Blacks. It was intensified in the ghetto.

Blacks were stuck in blue-collar jobs through the 1960s with only a small percentage in professional, managerial and other white-collar positions. On that basis, they have made impressive strides in the decades since desegregation. This has involved a long and complex struggle for entry into organized labor that began with formal exclusion, then later segregated locals and complex strife within trade and craft unions requiring strategies of government intervention, legal suits against corporations and considerable court action. Antagonism against Blacks by older working classes was especially severe because at times, as with other populations attempting to enter into organized labor, the only way of entry available for Blacks was as scabs and strike breakers. More fundamentally, many older working populations resented both the closing of the gap, and special or preferential treatment of new working minority groups.

Even after desegregation, a wide range of programs has been necessary to close the equity gap, and the Black struggle for economic equity has been fought on many fronts simultaneously. This has required cooperation of other groups, not only in the Civil Rights movement but also among the White majority in business, and the building of new development programs within the institutional framework. Despite these hard-won changes, Blacks at the bottom of the system continue to have significantly higher unemployment rates, with non-White teenagers having the highest unemployment rates of all.

Strategies employed by Blacks for dealing with discrimination polarized the Black community (Greer, 1984). Organized protest and strategies for reform coexisted with less moderate orientations, but again there were class and stratum differences. For example, along with organized protest there was rioting of ghetto populations in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A study of the participants in the Detroit riots showed that the average participant was in the 20-30 age

range, undereducated compared to the control group, male, and from the most disadvantaged group within the Black population (Akers & Fox, 1969, pp. 298-303). The profile of the rioter in the Detroit context was that of an unskilled laborer employed in menial activities who felt barred from getting a better job because of discrimination by employers. This pattern contrasted with the mainstream Black approach to social change through orderly protest and use of the court system.

In sum, a protracted history of tension and confrontation, and of attempts to redress the economic situation, made "the Black problem" more extreme than the case of other minorities. Rates of crime and delinquency among Blacks must be compared with those of other populations in parallel structural positions of high discrimination, having histories of struggle and conflict viewed as a threat to the social order by the dominant culture. As Liska and Champlin (1984) note, in communities that are segregated, where income inequality is most extreme, and in general where a non-White group constitutes more than one-fourth of the population, the minority population tends to be viewed as posing a substantial threat and as a problem for greater crime control.

Lack of change in the position of the urban Black poor also relates to lack of change in basic policies. The problem of underdevelopment in low-status communities of advanced industrial countries continues to be resolved by welfare strategies, in the absence of powerful coalitions and alliances across groups. As Jennings (1983) notes, "benefits are kept low to encourage low wage work." The strategy of welfare as against economic development, retraining and modernization lead to a cycle of reactions of unrest, antagonism and dependency. Riots in the inner city reinforce the vicious cycle: as Jennings (1983) argues, they have positive short-term advantages in that following them, welfare benefits are often expanded.

Welfare as a solution, however, maintains the status quo, ultimately leading to dead-end jobs, further dependency and low-wage work. As welfare benefits are paid in accordance with the number of dependent children, welfare also encourages large family size, and impacts on the size and number of single families headed by women. Welfare, as opposed to the creation of more jobs and opportunities, is thus a major contributory factor retarding change. Given a choice between welfare and dead-end jobs, there are many factors that lead those in bottom strata to ask the question, "why work?" (Aronowitz, 1985).

While the strategies of ghetto males also differ, with youth taking alternative pathways, some towards success and others temporarily into patterns of delinquency, the downward spiral characteristically involves central orientation to the peer group in the context of ghetto street life, often at the expense of educational attainment. Ghettos often develop their own internal status and ranking systems. As Rainwater (1970, p. 287) notes, one method of gaining status in the ghetto is by testing one's wit, courage and entrepreneurial skills against others. But in this system, "the very activities that produce rewards are also likely to expose one to danger, because the zero-sum situation stimulates persons to react violently, when they learn they have lost. To be cool means to learn how to minimize dangers, and to cope effectively with the inevitable attacks that will be directed against the successful practitioner of the street arts." During a normal period of consolidation of self identity and gender

identity, young male ghetto dwellers out on the streets and involved with street culture are at high risk given the high stakes of ranking one's self as against others.

Consequently, although many more young Black males make it out of the ghetto than in previous decades, there is a continued problem of proliferation of delinquents. In the extreme, a proportion of Black underclass youth remains as yet too little changed by advances elsewhere in the system. The syndrome is most acute, as has been suggested throughout this discussion, in those populations with few ties to middle-class or mainstream society, and to the achieving segments within the ghetto (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983, p. 11).

### **The School Failure Cycle**

Across the world, anthropologists have noted that various minority groups in the lower-income strata tend to have higher school failure rates, more school problems, and more elevated rates of delinquency, and to show greater school alienation, so that there is a complex interaction of sociological and psychodynamic issues (Devos, 1978). As Devos (1978, p. 241) notes, "discrimination has long-term effects on the members of disparaged minorities." These include effects on self-image, and also differential socio-cultural and socialization experience. With modernization comes the necessity for higher education to enter into middle- and upper-income jobs. This change can widen the gap further. Family orientation towards education within the lower economic strata is often quite variable. In some cases families push adolescents towards achievement, but it is as likely that parents will expect school failure and may even consciously or unconsciously pass on negative attitudes towards work and authority (Colvin & Pauly, 1983), or question the capacities of their own children for intellectual work (Willis & Corrigan, 1983).

Doubt of the ability of children and adolescents in disparaged minorities is only too readily confirmed if attention is directed to observable performance in early school work: children of disparaged minorities begin school with considerable differences in relative competitive advantage. They are more likely to have problems in language. For many the standard language or dialect is not the language or dialect of the home. They come more commonly from cultural backgrounds that are different from that of the dominant culture, a fact that often has serious implications for performance on standardized tests.

In some circumstances this reality of variable preparation for school by social class and strata has stimulated headstart programs and special focuses within schools. In the U.S. there were, and continue to be, massive struggles over school desegregation. A not uncommon reaction of middle-income families has been to move their children in great numbers to private schools. Even in public schools attempting to meet the needs of different populations, for these kinds of reasons, the child of disadvantaged minorities is less likely to receive positive feedback as a potential school achiever, unlike many children who are not starting from a competitive disadvantage. Instead, the children of disadvantaged minorities are more often placed in remedial programs, and less likely to be recognized as gifted or even normally intelligent.

Later school performance and status attainment are not only influenced by-

early objective school preparation but are also mediated through early subjective views of the child's ability. Many children are labeled early in negative ways. Records from one grade are passed on to the next. Labeling theory itself would predict different potential tracks for deviance by socio-economic and cultural sectors (Colvin & Pauly, 1983). There is a notable tendency for the normal order of things at every level to shape the child - especially a male, non-White child from the subaltern population - into an educationally backward, disadvantaged *or* educationally disabled role, given both stereotypic thinking and the variation of early preparation. There are also persistent issues of racial, ethnic and class loyalties.

Class position has many effects, which are often less recognized. Some researchers emphasize differences in class and strata codes, especially as they affect males. Lower-income males are more likely than middle-class males *or* females to respond to a confrontation aggressively, to equate masculinity with aggressive self-assertion, and to associate school and school authorities with what is oppressive (Willis & Corrigan, 1983). This readiness towards confrontation often contrasts with the greater tendency towards conformity of middleclass boys, and it is more likely that the lower-income male, disadvantaged, minority student will be labeled a troublemaker *or* conduct disordered.

Taking on this role can also be a form of escape from being labeled as incompetent, retarded, educationally underachieving *or* unable to achieve. For a variety of reasons including disadvantage in preparation, class and strata codes for males, and issues of ethnic and class loyalty, the lower-income students are more likely to be pulled into the camp of school problems and deviants than middle-class children. Schools, to varying degrees, are divided by conformists and deviants, so that deviant behavior becomes an important criterion for placement in school peer groups. For the most part, there are clear socioeconomic differences between these contrastive groups, which in extreme cases can become highly polarized.

It is often very difficult to measure the contribution of any single system. Many researchers emphasize the important variable of perceived opportunity structure; here, as Jessor et al. (1968) note, "the relation between values and goals, on the one hand, and expectations of attaining them by a set of socially approved *or* prescribed behaviors on the other hand" interact. A wide range of variables in personality structure and personal belief systems interact with aspects of small group structure to produce either alienation *or* involvement and conformity.

Researchers differ in their assessments of the significance of personal controls as opposed to the power of transactions and small group process. There is also considerable disagreement about the impact of esteem, but the general rule *of thumb* is that adolescents are not "inoculated against delinquency until they are average or better in school" (Jensen, 1976).

Schools may widen the gap by policies which very early on locate children as school failures. Various government agencies and youth studies have identified school policies as a persistent major contributory factor to school drop out or push out. Menard and Morse (1984) *offer* a striking critique of the I.Q. issue. Following a comparative empirical analysis of school policies they conclude that "the association between I.Q. and delinquency is so weak as to be negli-

ble and at best receives weak empirical support." Low I.Q. does not predict delinquency, but what they term "structural variables" does: the critical intervening variables are school policies, practices and plans.

The I.Q. of students at the beginning need not be directly related to alienation, drop out and delinquency, rather it depends on how schools deal with the problems of students beginning at a disadvantage. For the most part, schools have difficulty striking balance between needs and demands to prepare the captains and leaders of the country, which are the roles often viewed as appropriate for middle- and upper-income children, and to make up for underpreparation and potential school failures, the role too often viewed as inevitable for lower-income children, especially those from minority groups. Schools can and do decrease esteem of children by segregation practices, by testing too early for I.Q., by providing children beginning at a disadvantage with understimulating material and by the persistent habit of negative labeling. Low-income families may also be more likely than upper- and middle-income families to be unwilling to challenge the system or its assessments of a child's potential.

The surface manifestation of symptoms such as truancy or many so-called conduct disorders can stand for a range of different underlying problems. This continuum may include families placing too much stress on adolescents and children, having been given too little support themselves. It may signal problems in language or preparation. It may also signal low expectations of success or a depressed attitude towards future possibilities, or it may reflect many different tensions simultaneously.

The extremely elevated rates of early school leaving for low-income groups, especially disparaged minorities at a world wide level, suggests continued covert segregation practices shaping school failure and later delinquency rates. School authority and families often inadvertently collude in setting the stage for low self-esteem, disbelief in ability and negative views of the system in low-income adolescents. Colvin and Pauly emphasize the significance of poor role models as well. Many factors simultaneously encourage greater involvement of low income adolescents with deviant peer groups as a way of providing some anchorage for the self-system, given lower rates of success in school and diminished expectations of future success.

Problems in school preparation that are not properly attended to in early grades grow as children move through the school cycle and become less easily controlled by parents and teachers. School authorities can unconsciously take an elitist position and view the removal of children who do not appear promising early on as part of the normal order of things, or even as an action to improve the school.

The educationally disadvantaged adolescent is weeded out and disappears, but the structure of thinking that strongly encouraged his or her removal remains, often in the same school and program. This action is frequently justified with the rationale that greater attention can then be paid to the children defined early on as bright or gifted. This type of action saves the school from having to deal with an adolescent with problems; the adolescent may be routinely routed to a social worker. It is an action that is probably also more common in schools under considerable pressures which result from too many problem adolescents and too few resources.

Statistics show that Black urban poor males have far greater problems than females, with significantly fewer males than females making it into higher education (Cordes, 1984). Black underclass and lower working-class males have extremely elevated drop out rates. Why should there be such a pervasive need to challenge the system in such cases? Many of the factors discussed above produce this response in the Black urban poor males. School confrontations generally occur during the period where males are consolidating their sexual identity, going through periods of exploration, trying on new roles and identities and attempting to gain acceptance by other males - but these actions are played out within different socio-cultural or socio-economic class codes.

For the middle-class or upper-class boy achievement may be defined by excellence in school performance, but for the lower socio-economic male achievement may be associated with courage, bravery, prowess and daring. In the case of minority males the teacher may be White and female. Not to express one's male identity and dignity in the face of humiliating behavior may be felt as considerable loss of self-esteem or may be read by a Black minority member as acting like a Sambo or an Uncle Tom.

The dialogue for males in many such confrontations is about gender identity, ethnic identity, self respect, and separation and autonomy. For teachers it is about respect for school authority, respect for education, and respect for their work and contribution *to* society. But the apparent rejection of school and school authority begins with the wide disparity in preparation and expectations of disparaged minorities, and this in turn is the product of a wide range of factors. Yet the consequence is that many potential achievers from the lower socio-economic classes, especially disparaged minorities, enter the ranks of the "ineligible candidates" for upward mobility.

### **Delinquent as Hero: Reversal of the Order of Things**

As Calluri (1985, p. 42) notes, "youth culture has been characterized by American Functionalist theory as a phase demarcated by age boundaries where hedonistic frivolous, overly romantic, irresponsible, and sometimes delinquent behavior manifestations are vented before the onset of adulthood." The extent to which this stereotype is valid is related to factors such as change in the means of production with the result that adolescent labor is no longer part and parcel of the family production process. It is also related to the fact that adolescent labor is generally undervalued, underpaid and underskilled. It occurs in societies that tend to value leisure and *to* view unskilled labor as demeaning. More fundamentally, however, many adolescents have inherited a complex class, ethnic and racial problematic.

Magical solutions are sought by adolescents, particularly in environments characterized by an absence of adult leadership, and in which the wider societal context is characterized by a discarding of traditional values and few solutions that provide anchorage. A lack of anchorage in systems becomes a factor setting into motion the search for meaning and for self-identity and self-testing. Youth subcultures "present strategies for surviving the degradation" of membership in a category between childhood and adulthood (Calluri, 1985, p.42), for

separating from parents in societies in which separation is promoted as a value, and for dealing with the inherited class problematic.

Youth culture and gangs offer a collective solution to the problem of being in transition, which is especially significant for adolescents who have no future in higher education and no life of reward and respect to which they can look forward. Often adolescent activities are a collective and minimal series of unorganized protest.

There is considerable evidence in delinquency and gang behavior of experiences of threat, especially in the form of fear of invasion of territory by other groups, loss of one's place and significance against other groups, fear of not being powerful enough so that there are constant displays of power and anger against schools. In their rebellion and reaction adolescents also show involvement with a variety of persistent themes. The theme of keeping up with things, having motion and momentum, knowing what is current and trendy, and not being left behind, is a powerful defense against feelings of being "out of it." In the absence of leadership that can confront the contradictions and transform them into positive plans for social change, anxieties take a negative and retrograde form. Adolescent groups then turn on one another, finding in this way a series of concrete and specific targets on which to test themselves against others.

Gender anxiety takes the form of sexism, sexual exploitation of women and heavy investment in male bonding. The pattern of sexual conquest runs as a theme that is most pronounced among males, and particularly blatant in ghetto males who have low employment possibilities. If one has considerable difficulty proving one's masculinity in school and the work sphere, there are opportunities in the sexual arena to strike a balance. Preoccupation with ranking oneself against others becomes part of ghetto culture: if one cannot establish a place in the wider society and community and its institutions, then the need to find a place becomes exaggerated and must be worked out within a specific local group. The normal patterns of adolescent self-testing become intensified when they are filtered through subcultural forms and codes for males at the bottom of the ladder. Attacks on the old, the weak and the more helpless similarly may indicate a need to demonstrate to oneself or one's group that at least "we are more powerful than they are."

Common patterns in gangs are mobilization along ethnic lines, and retreat or escape into attention-getting and angry behavior. Yet it is hardly clear that the average court-remanded youth differs significantly from the youth not brought before the court as a result of motivation to succeed or find an acceptable place in society, or that the former lacks innate intellectual potential or is inevitably more pathological. A major difference is that more often he or she is poor, coming from a family at or below the poverty level, from an educational disadvantaged background. He or she is also ethnically and racially different from the dominant culture, and typically has less skills and lower success rates in school. A major difference is consignment to different environments, where different treatment and stimuli are often received. The emphasis in the literature on poor moral values has received only very weak and inconclusive support from empirical research. Studies have more often shown that criminal, delinquent and deviant behavior is not inevitably associated with normlessness or

positive values toward violence, although it may be in some cases. More fundamentally, it is at this level that there is significant variation within subpopulations. Most adolescents are trying to separate from families and *feel* they should be independent, but are seeking anchorage and reinforcement of gender identity generally through the peer group. Bravado and high self-testing often masks confusion, and feelings of powerlessness and lack of belonging.

Youth cultures have the advantage of being "tightly knit groups," which provide "distinct activities, concerns and territorial space, generally distinguished by age, generation, gender, race or ethnic group" (Calluri, 1985, pp. 43-44). In this respect they provide needed structure, plans, guidance and protection. They provide identity in almost a totemic sense, as if creating differences nearly at a species level. Gangs, for example, parallel tightly knit male groups with the unity of air force squadrons that promote male solidarity as against other units and squadrons. Gangs are too often the fraternal orders *of* the poor and educationally disadvantaged. Gangs also act out the social and sexual tensions of multiracial and multiethnic societies (Calluri, 1985).

The males who have least real power in the society seek, through these kinds of so-called cultural solutions, to turn the margin into the center and to assert the power of the comparatively powerless. They also tend to destroy and damage property in societies where ownership *of* property is central and the basis of status differences. Their attempt to redress the imbalance *of* deprivation may be expressed by stealing, or breaking into the very places which deny them access. Far from being trivial, frivolous, meaningless or accidentally hooliganistic, these kinds of activities are often very structured although not inevitably conscious forms *of* social protest. Gang members often make a point of emphasizing their rough and readiness in contrast to the emphasized respectability of middle upper-class youth, almost as if posing a challenge. Garb is often designed to make the adolescents look more dangerous, fearsome, aggressive and powerful as if to assert that they are deviant by choice and desire, all of which plays into and reinforces class and ethnic and racial stereotypes.

Calluri (1985, p. 51) notes that New Wave Subcultural theory seeks to understand what youth (in particular working-class youth) is trying to articulate. It provides us with a useful tool to uncover new tactics *of* cultural subversion, and to learn from the strengths and faults of subcultures how to build a strategy for surviving the degradation *of* everyday life in the post-modern world. Even though youth subculture may open temporary "magical" solutions, its persistence and universal importance lies in the fact that it is presenting an alternative to the existing order of things.

Youth subculture is but one aspect of wider countercultural movement{ which seek to reverse the order *of* things. Utopian communes, new religions and returns to fundamentalist religion all represent different types of strategies to deal with rapidly changing societies in which too many people experience a lack of anchorage. Youth tends to build identity and organization in terms of what is ready at hand in the environment, in the absence of positive social movements or legitimate political activity and organization, other types of small scale social units develop and take over.

As noted earlier, delinquency, among other things, is a way of dealing with school failure - a way of taking up the role of challenger to the system. The heroic stance is fed by many diverse streams, even As Aronowitz (1983) observes

there have been two traditional theories within the working-class and labor movement about the role *of* the worker: these are the "heroic" and "instrumental" views. The first proposes that the worker will challenge and transform the system. In retrograde form, this leads to many oppositional practices which can be defined as "ripping off the system," "striking a blow against the system" and toe like. Opposition to the "system" has some legitimacy as a position in working-class historical struggles. There is also the instrumental view of progress within labor history, that privileges can be gained through negotiation and slow incremental change. Ethnic and minority groups seeking majority status are often divided along parallels with respect to these strategies.

The tendency to look for heroic and magical solutions is probably greater in the subaltern class as compared to the working class which has a longer tradition *of* negotiation and progress via negotiation. Frustration and oppositional tendencies become even more extreme in subaltern populations when traditional cultural solutions no longer work, or as traditional culture begins to break down in the assimilation process. Youth anchored in traditional culture is generally less vulnerable than those caught in the gap and interface. Many populations that have been stabilized become destabilized as advancing technology erodes their position, jobs and status. Thus delinquency rates can rise as populations struggle to find solutions to the twin problems of assimilation and competition in societies with advanced technology, and when the traditional jobs of the lower socio-economic groups are increasingly being eroded.

The degradation of underskilled or unskilled labor becomes another component, as labor available to adolescents in this predicament rarely satisfies the need for mastery, prowess, bravery or competence. Many jobs available are organized into quite authoritarian hierarchies. There is also a tense period as adolescents work through the grim prospect *of* what Willis (1981) calls "learning to labor." Many factors converge to create the "peak age" period of delinquency between 15-17.

A magnifying glass on this kind of behavior in delinquency would reveal the intent towards revolution or at least rebellion at a collective level acted out more *often* by certain clusters of adolescents than others. Themes of resistance characterize popular culture, particularly those elements directed at an adolescent audience. Youth culture vacillates between the vision of heroic nonconformity and concerns about anchorage and respectability. The challenge to the dominant order is, for example, exemplified by mass culture music such as rock and roll:

. . . its resistance remains within the political space of the dominant culture, its opposition is only a "simulacrum" of revolution. Rock and roll's resistance, its politics is neither a direct rejection of the dominant culture nor a utopian negation *of* the structures *of* power. It plays with the very practice that the dominant culture uses to resist its resistance: incorporation and excorporation in a continuous dialectic that reproduces the very boundary *of* resistance. (Grossberg, 1983-1984)

Many different types of syndromes develop in the gap between desire and possibility. Delinquents often metaphorically reproduce the patterns of conspicious-

uous passivity, and then opposition and resistance which, as Willis (1981) notes, are the polarities against which the struggle of the working class and underclass persists. These extremes are probably not uncharacteristic of people caught in a bind and who experience themselves as comparatively powerless to change things or escape to new levels and alternatives. Negation of the position of being marginal, peripheral and powerless for many is logically linked to making one's presence felt by opposition, given the absence of any other coherent and satisfying solution or place for one in the normal order of things.

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